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Good organizational controls are 
important in all areas of business, 
but they are particularly important in 
data processing. Unfortunately, this 
area is frequently overlooked 
because data processing personnel 
do not usually have direct control or 
access to cash and other assets. 
However, in many cases, access to 
the data processing system can ac­
tually give an individual the ability to 
affect transfers of a company’s cash, 
and other assets.
In, “The Auditor’s Study and 
Evaluation of Internal Control in EDP 
Systems,” the first three general 
controls discussed deal with the 
issue of proper segregation of 
duties. These controls are listed as 
follows:1
General Control No. 1 — 
Segregation of functions be­
tween the EDP department 
and users.
General Control No. 2 — Provi­
sion for general authoriza­
tion over the execution of 
transactions (prohibiting the 
EDP department from initia­
tion or authorizing transac­
tions).
General Control No. 3 — 
Segregation of functions 
within the EDP department.
Organization represents an impor­
tant influence on internal control 
with an impact on both the efficiency 
with which data is processed and the 
accuracy of the records produced. 
Good organization can provide a 
system of checks and balances that 
can prevent or quickly detect incon­
sistencies or omissions.
Segregation of Functions 
between EDP and Users
The data processing department 
does not create information, nor 
does it act as the end user. It is only 
a processing facility that makes it 
possible for user departments to in­
crease the efficiency of recording 
and processing data generated by 
those departments and to maximize 
the use or benefit derived from this 
information. The source or user 
departments have responsibility for 
proper authorization of data and in 
many instances for verifying the 
accuracy of source data.
EDP should be separated from 
source and user departments and 
should have no incompatible func­
tions within the company. For exam-
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ple, the functions of initiating and 
authorizing transactions, recording 
transactions, and maintaining 
custody of assets should all be 
segregated. Since the EDP depart­
ment is heavily involved in the 
recording (processing) of transac­
tions, it should not initiate or author­
ize them. Except for the computer 
hardware itself and the other equip­
ment and supplies of the EDP depart­
ment, it should not be charged with 
the custody of assets.
Employees who initiate trans­
actions, especially master file 
changes, can perpetrate errors or 
irregularities unless there is third- 
party control or review. The ability to 
conceal errors or irregularities is or­
dinarily limited by the extent to 
which these employees have un­
controlled access to data files or 
programs. For example, an 
employee might be able to initiate a 
pay rate change in a master file. If a 
list of all these changes is printed 
and independently reviewed, any 
unauthorized changes could be 
detected. An independent review of 
the payroll register, such as a com­
parison with supporting documents, 
might also disclose a pay rate higher 
than that authorized. If, however, the 
employee also has unrestricted ac­
cess to the payroll programs, that 
employee could suppress the print­
ing of unauthorized pay change on 
the change list and could print a pay 
rate on the payroll register different 
from that used to calculate gross 
pay. The responsibilities of initiating 
processing, and reviewing transac­
tions should therefore be organiza­
tionally segregated.
User Responsibilities for 
Application Controls
Generally, user departments 
should be accountable for ensuring 
that the work done by the DP depart­
ment is consistent with their 
authorization and their expectations. 
Source documents should be cre­
ated and maintained by user depart­
ments.
User departments should estab­
lish control totals before submitting 
the data to EDP for processing. 
Some installations, however, estab­
lish control totals in the machine 
room; here, some other form of con­
trol, such as prenumbered docu­
ments, should be in effect to insure 
that all documents are processed. If 
neither of these controls is used, 
others must be developed.
Although control totals can be 
taken of almost anything, some that 
are commonly used include: footing 
totals of dollar and quantity fields, 
record counts, and hash totals of ac­
count numbers or any other signifi­
cant numerical fields such as dates. 
If any of these control totals do not 
agree with the manually computed 
totals, an error report should be 
generated and predetermined pro­
cedures used for correction of the 
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erroneous data and re-entry of the 
corrected data. User departments 
should be actively involved in the 
identification and correction of the 
errors.
Each application should include a 
procedure for authorizing input 
transactions. Authorization is nor­
mally evidenced by a signature or a 
stamp on a source document or by 
user department approval of a batch 
of documents. In systems where in­
put is not supported by documents, 
authorization may be controlled by a 
program that checks an internal 
table in the computer to determine if 
the individual is authorized to both 
operate the terminal and enter that 
type of transaction. Terminal and 
user identification is then stored as 
part of the input transaction.
Many applications involve a large 
number of transactions for relatively 
small dollar amounts. In such cases, 
management may issue a general 
authorization for handling all trans­
actions of a given amount or less. 
This is acceptable when specific 
authorization for each transaction is 
not practical.
Output control functions can be 
performed by the user department, a 
separate control group, or the com­
puter itself. Output controls should 
insure that output data is complete 
and reasonable, that output reports 
are distributed only to authorized 
persons, and that machine-readable 
output is properly identified. It is also 
important to remember that output 
not only consists of reports pro­
duced for user departments but also 
of newly produced data or master 
files which will be used as input for 
subsequent processing runs.
An effective technique for verify­
ing output is the development of con­
trol totals that can be balanced 
against input controls and that can 
also be used to test the consistency 
of results. Original input controls 
such as record counts, control 
totals, and hash totals can be car­
ried throughout the processing to 
serve in the verification of process­
ing results. Those performing the 
reconciliation should be independ­
ent of both the department originat­
ing the information (the source 
department) and the EDP depart­
ment. Where the overall reconcilia­
tion is done by the computer, a re­
conciliation report should be gener­
ated for the user department or con­
trol group to examine. The user 
department should review the 
reasonableness of all the computer’s 
calculations. Lists of master file revi­
sions should be carefully reviewed 
because incorrect changes and 
such items as incorrect pay rates 
and selling prices or uncontrolled 
changes in credit limits can negate 
the results of otherwise well-con­
trolled and supervised processing.
For each application, those per­
sons receiving printed reports 
should be clearly identified. The 
number of output copies produced 
should be closely controlled, partic­
ularly for those reports containing 
highly confidential information. In 
addition to the expected output, 
error listings and exceptions reports 
should be carefully distributed to 
those individuals having respon­
sibility for the correction of errors or 
irregularities. A production schedule 
is one way to provide control over 
distribution of output reports by 
allowing recipients to anticipate 
when such reports should be 
received and to take corrective 
action when they are not.
User Participation 
in System Development
The user must clearly define and 
support the objectives that a system 
is to accomplish. It is impossible 
either to develop a system or to 
evaluate it if the objective against 
which that system is to be measured 
are unknown or the information 
about input data, required process­
ing, and output data is not clear. 
Therefore, the appropriate user 
department personnel should be in­
volved in systems design and testing 
and final approval of the completed 
system.
An important control in the 
systems development process is ap­
propriate authorization of the plan, 
and regular appraisal and supervi­
sion of the progress of the systems 
development project. The participa­
tion of the user department in this 
activity is a critical factor in insuring 
properly defined and developed 
systems.
User review and approval should 
be an ongoing process throughout 
the systems design and development 
activity. Appropriate management 
and user approval should be re­
quired of the initial design. In addi­
tion, user personnel should partici­
pate in or monitor the test and 
developmental stages. After a 
system has been fully developed and 
before it is placed in operation, it 
should receive final approval from 
the appropriate levels of manage­
ment and user personnel. This 
should include examination of final 
results and review of the documenta­
tion and any changes from the origi­
nal design specifications.
Segregation of Duties 
with EDP
Within the data processing 
organization itself, there should be a 
basic division between the systems 
development function and the opera­
tions function. The systems develop­
ment function is concerned with 
planning, designing, programming, 
and testing a processing system.
The operations functions involve 
the use of the hardware and proc­
essing systems (including the pro­
grams that form part of that system) 
to receive input data from the depart­
ments in which it originates, to 
process that data using approved 
procedures, and to deliver the output 
to appropriate users. Generally, the 
operations functions include the 
following activities: data control, 
data conversion, file control, com­
puter operations, and program li­
brary control. Depending upon the 
size of the installation, these ac­
tivities may be performed by the 
same individuals or by separate 
staffs.
An appropriate separation of 
responsibilities provides for a series 
of checks and balances, making 
fraudulent use of the accounting 
data more difficult and furnishing an 
automatic review process that can 
help discover unintentional errors. In 
a data processing installation, this 
means that operators who have 
physical access to the computer 
should have only controlled access 
to preselected files. They should not 
be allowed to participate in the 
systems design activities nor have 
an opportunity to make changes in 
operating programs through un­
controlled access to the program 
libraries or the program loading 
procedures.
The control function should be 
performed independently to check 
on the results produced by the 
operating procedures, using the 
facilities built into the system to bal­
ance the data results obtained with 
the control criteria supplied by the
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source and user departments. 
Although the data and file control 
groups have access to the data, they 
should not have access to the pro­
grams or to the computer equipment. 
Whenever possible a separate con­
trol group should be established 
which is responsible for receiving 
data from user departments, check­
ing for proper authorization, verify­
ing or establishing user batch con­
trols, and returning processing 
results to user departments after 
verifying that they balance with input 
and EDP-generated controls.
In very small installations it may 
not be possible to segregate duties, 
and alternate or compensating con­
trols must be instituted. In such 
cases, user departments must 
assume responsibility for controlling 
input and output.
Deliberate attempts to use data- 
processing equipment to perpetrate 
fraud are sometimes difficult to con­
trol. A knowledgeable, intelligent 
operator could manipulate data in a 
manner that could overcome the pro­
gram controls when that individual 
is familiar with the computer system 
and its supporting software, has a 
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detailed knowledge of the programs 
and files, and has adequate un­
supervised time at the computer. At 
the same time, a good programmer 
with access to the computer and 
knowledge of the files has a similar 
opportunity. Collusion between an 
operator and a programmer could 
increase the possibilities of detailed 
knowledge of program and access 
to the computer. Installation man­
agement, therefore, must continually 
guard against such possibilities.
To make unauthorized changes, 
an individual must have access to 
the data or programs. To prevent 
these changes, there should be 
physical and/or computer-based 
controls over equipment, transaction 
files, master files, programs and re­
lated documentation. If possible, 
these files should be maintained in a 
computer file library under the con­
trol of a librarian independent of 
computer operations and program­
ming. Weaknesses here may be 
mitigated by effective input and out­
put controls, effective use of internal 
and external file labels, and process­
ing duplicate control copies of 
programs on a surprise basis.
Summary
Proper division of responsibilities 
means dividing duties among the 
available personnel in order to 
minimize opportunities for manipu­
lation of the system. At a minimum 
there should be a separation of the 
responsibilities for systems develop­
ment (including the systems design 
and programming functions) and 
operational activities. This separa­
tion between systems development 
and operations lessens the 
possibility that necessary controls 
within programs or procedures will 
be eliminated or bypassed by the 
operators and insures, on the other 
hand, that the incentive for systems 
development personnel to incorpo­
rate personally advantageous 
routines will be minimized. The 
temptation to program the computer 
to calculate a particular payroll 
check differently from others or to 
post a particular customer account 
differently from others is less if the 
programmer does not have access 
to the operational data and realizes 
that another will see the reports.
Wherever possible, systems 
design and programming also 
should be separated to avoid undue 
concentration in one person or 
group. Similarly, within the opera­
tions function there should be a sep­
aration between the library function 
that retains physical control and bal­
ancing function. Access to the com­
puter and related library areas 
should be limited to authorized per­
sonnel. Once written, object pro­
grams should be accessible only to 
the operations personnel. At the 
same time, operations personnel 
should have only limited, controlled
access to program source copies.
A continuing effort should be 
made to insure that the users of 
data-processing reports continually 
verify their accuracy and usefulness, 
that the control of physical assets be 
maintained separately from the 
recordkeeping process, and that, 
wherever possible, responsibilities 
within the data-processing depart­
ment be segregated in such a way as 
to minimize the opportunities for 
fraudulent manipulation.Ω
1The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of In­
ternal Control in EDP Systems, (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants, 1977), pp. 26-30.
